Essential Corporate Bankruptcy Law by Couwenberg, Oscar & Lubben, Stephen J.
  
 University of Groningen
Essential Corporate Bankruptcy Law
Couwenberg, Oscar; Lubben, Stephen J.
Published in:
European Business Organization Law Review
DOI:
10.1007/s40804-015-0006-y
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2015
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Couwenberg, O., & Lubben, S. J. (2015). Essential Corporate Bankruptcy Law. European Business
Organization Law Review, 16(1), 39-61. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-015-0006-y
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
1 23







Eur Bus Org Law Rev (2015) 16:39-61
DOI 10.1007/s40804-015-0006-y
Essential Corporate Bankruptcy Law
Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben
1 23
Your article is published under the Creative
Commons Attribution license which allows
users to read, copy, distribute and make
derivative works, as long as the author of
the original work is cited. You may self-
archive this article on your own website, an
institutional repository or funder’s repository
and make it publicly available immediately.
ARTICLE
Essential Corporate Bankruptcy Law
Oscar Couwenberg • Stephen J. Lubben
Published online: 31 March 2015
 The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This article begins from a simple observation: Chapter 11 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code is the global standard for corporate restructuring, but at the
same time it is a far more complex procedure than most jurisdictions seem to require.
This observation begs the question what parts of a bankruptcy system are ‘essential’.
We argue that two elements are essential because they cannot be achieved by con-
tracting alone: asset stabilisation and asset separation. Stabilisation ensures that the
firm’s options are maintained. Asset separation ensures that the assets underlying these
options can be separated from liabilities that are attached to them by law or contract.
Both these elements drive much of the rules that are necessary to resolve distress but
also show that parts of Chapter 11 are ‘unessential’ – for example, rules regarding
reorganisation plans. Our goal is not to doubt the ‘richness and elasticity’ of corporate
bankruptcy, particularly in the United States, but to find the essential elements. Beyond
asset stabilisation and asset separation, features of the system are a matter of policy and
politics. Understanding this helps in structuring insolvency systems and shows that
Chapter 11 need not be the standard against which all other laws are measured.
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and Michael Simkovic for helpful comments.
O. Couwenberg (&)
Professor of Law and Economics




Harvey Washington Wiley Chair in Corporate Governance & Business Ethics
Seton Hall University School of Law, Newark, NJ, USA
e-mail: stephen.lubben@shu.edu
123
Eur Bus Org Law Rev (2015) 16:39–61
DOI 10.1007/s40804-015-0006-y
Keywords Bankruptcy law  Reorganisation  Financial distress
1 Introduction
In every developed economy, and in most developing economies too, the question
of what to do with financially distressed businesses is a matter of concern.1 The
United States has a long history of corporate restructuring law, starting with the
reorganisation of railroads in the nineteenth century2 and continuing through
Chapter 113 in its current form.4 This naturally leads to a tendency to adopt
Chapter 11, or something like it.5
But why? In particular, Chapter 11 is a rather ornate system of corporate
reorganisation.6 And in recent years it has been adorned with elements that reflect
little more than particular creditors’ ability to successfully lobby Congress.7 During
the early years of Chapter 11, many critics called for its repeal, arguing that it could
easily be replaced by contract or elements of basic corporate law.8 In recent years,
many of these same critics came to herald Chapter 11 as an efficient way to transfer
assets to new owners.9
So, does Chapter 11 provide something that could be achieved by contract, or
does it do something more? That is, does Chapter 11 provide something that could
not be achieved by contract?10 And does all of Chapter 11 serve this function?
In short, what, if any, are the essential elements of corporate bankruptcy law?11
We offer an answer to that question here, arguing that two elements of
Chapter 11 are essential: asset stabilisation and asset separation. These two aspects
of Chapter 11 could not be established other than by statute.12
Asset stabilisation refers to the ability to temporarily protect assets as a coherent
whole. It includes obvious things like the stay on individual creditor collection, but
1 Bebchuk (1988), at p. 776.
2 Lubben (2004) (discussing the history of corporate restructuring in the United States, which initially
featured extensive involvement of investment bankers like JP Morgan) and Markell (1991), at pp. 74–77.
3 United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1174.
4 Warren and Westbrook (2009), at pp. 612–40. Cf. Clark (1981), at pp. 1250–54.
5 Westbrook (2000), at pp. 2278–79 nn. 2–15 (detailing bankruptcy reform efforts throughout the world);
see also Eisenberg and Sundgren (1997) and Eisenberg and Tagashira (1994).
6 LoPucki and Whitford (1990), at p. 126.
7 See Lubben (2012a), Ondersma (2013), at p. 111, Roe (2011) and Simkovic (2009), at p. 253.
8 Baird (1993), Rasmussen (1992), Roe (1983), at p. 559, and Skeel (1994).
9 Ayotte and Skeel (2006), Baird and Rasmussen (2002a) and Skeel (2003), at p. 918. Some then backed
away from their embrace of the new order following the GM and Chrysler Chapter 11 cases. See Roe and
Skeel (2010).
10 Cf. Romano (1989), at p. 1599.
11 See generally Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) (asking a similar question with regard to state
corporate law). In this paper, we posit that corporate bankruptcy law is or should be seen as an integral
part of organisational law, but we focus on a subset of organisational law that Hansmann and Kraakman
neglected.
12 Others, of course, disagree. E.g., Schwartz (1998), at p. 1851.
40 O. Couwenberg, S. J. Lubben
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also other features, such as the ability to provide post-bankruptcy liquidity to the
debtor and delays on termination of contracts with the debtor.
Asset separation captures the ability to separate assets from their concomitant
liabilities. This might take the form of a discharge, but we argue that, strictly
speaking, a discharge is not necessary to achieve asset separation.
Despite two decades of corporate scholarship, and countless overheated debates
on the merits of Chapter 11,13 neither of these two aspects of corporate bankruptcy
have been the focus of commentary or analysis to date.14
2 Financial Distress and Firms
Firms encounter financial distress for myriad reasons. One firm’s business model
might be fatally flawed: it has an interesting idea, but can never make money
pursuing it. Another firm might have assets that are out of scale with its business,
such as the airline that has more planes than it needs to serve its customers. And yet
another firm might be quite viable but for the debt it acquired in a leveraged buyout.
Often, it will not be immediately apparent at the point of distress what type of
debtor a particular firm is.
The firm itself is a package of assets – broadly defined to include employees and
other factors that contribute to firm value.15 The literature regarding particular firm
structures and their governance is well developed, but not particularly vital to our
discussion.16 Instead, we focus on the general notion that a firm is comprised of an
isolated group of assets that are subject to a variety of claims.
As a result of these claims, and the formal and informal power that the claimants
possess with regard to the firm, a distressed firm is particularly likely to be the
subject of competing impulses regarding future courses of action.17
Outside of financial distress, the resolution of these competing demands is
relatively straightforward. As a matter of formal law, firms typically have a defined
governance body that coordinates action.18 In the case of a corporation, this is the
board, and historically the most junior claimants elect the firm’s board, at least in
for-profit firms.19 In times of financial distress, the governance mechanism remains
in place, but the membership might change and the ability to control governance
becomes a point of contention.20
13 Easterbrook (1990), LoPucki (1992), Skeel (1993), Warren (1993) and Warren and Westbrook (2005).
14 More typically, the classic literature has focused on Chapter 11 as a solution to collective action
problems. Baird and Jackson (1984, 1988), Jackson (1982), Jackson and Scott (1989), at p. 176, and Scott
(1986).
15 See Warren (1992), at p. 468.
16 See, e.g., Bainbridge (2003), at p. 564–65; Bratton (1989), at p. 415; Dodd (1932), at pp. 1155–56;
Fish (2010) and Stout (2007), at pp. 804–05.
17 Jackson and Scott (1989), at pp. 177–78.
18 Del. Gen. Corp. Law. §141(a) (‘The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors….’).
19 Hansmann and Kraakman (2001), at p. 442.
20 See Hu and Westbrook (2007), at pp. 1331–48, and Tung (2009), at p. 117.
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Corporate bankruptcy provides a mechanism for resolving these competing
claims, and does so by allowing asset stabilisation and asset separation. Stabilisation
ensures that the firm’s operational options are maintained. Asset separation ensures
that the assets underlying these options can be separated from liabilities that by law
or contract are attached to them.
Both these functions are to be seen within the realm of organisational law, of
which, in our view, corporate bankruptcy is part and parcel.21
Organisational law provides the format in which the economic activities of firms
are set and has many aims – one of which is to protect the specific pool of assets
against claims by creditors of the owners (affirmative asset partitioning) and another
to delineate that pool by prohibiting creditors of the firm to grab assets of the owners
(defensive asset partitioning).22 Affirmative asset partitioning keeps the assets
together. It is the legal acknowledgment of the main insight of economic
organisation theory that assets brought together in a firm are what makes firms
valuable in the first place.23
It is also the main and most important reason why corporate bankruptcy is
different from consumer bankruptcy law.24 In a consumer bankruptcy, keeping
assets together is not as important since the income-generating asset – the indebted
consumer, who is also an employee or an entrepreneur – cannot be stripped from his
or her abilities.25 In a corporate bankruptcy, firms can easily be stripped of their
assets, in the process destroying any existing synergies.
To be sure, firms err in bringing assets together; they get too big, too small, too
diversified, and it is competition that gets these firms back in line, or ultimately
leads them to bankruptcy.26
Corporate bankruptcy law adds to affirmative asset partitioning the protection of
the integrity of the asset pool itself. Given the conscious decision of the firm’s
management to bring this particular constellation of assets together, negating that
decision upon financial distress would destroy any asset synergies.
This is the function of asset stabilisation in bankruptcy law. It should be noted
that it is superfluous outside bankruptcy. It is the board of directors that decides
upon a specific collection of assets and it is this same board that decides to keep it
this way or alter it.27 A protective function like asset stabilisation is thus not needed
in general organisational law.28
21 Cf. Skeel (1994), at pp 506–07.
22 See Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) for further refinements.
23 Obviously, this builds upon the arguments Ronald Coase put forth in 1937, see Coase (1937).
24 Conceding, of course, that sometimes the distinction is elusive in the case of small businesses. Lawless
and Warren (2005), at p. 768.
25 Baird (1987a), at p. 182.
26 E.g., Baird (1998), at p. 580.
27 E.g., Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 271 (requiring board approval to commence asset sales).
28 A case in point is when assets are not pooled at all, but allocated to different corporations. See Baird
and Casey (2013). As with bringing assets together, a (legal) separation of them is also to be seen as a
conscious decision. Obviously, the aim is to circumvent the asset stabilisation regime in bankruptcy
proceedings.
42 O. Couwenberg, S. J. Lubben
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Once in distress, however, the board no longer has sole decision-making
authority over the assets, as creditors’ rights are triggered by the initiation of a
bankruptcy procedure or some other indicator of distress.29
These rights can lead to the break-up of the asset pool, which may happen in two
ways. First, certain creditors may, by contract, have a claim that enables them to
withdraw and sell specific assets out of the pool to satisfy their claims, without any
obligation to take synergistic losses into account.30 Second, creditors may try to
better their position by grabbing assets out of the pool, as permitted by debt
collection law.31 Both lead to destruction of the pool of assets, hence the need for
asset stabilisation in bankruptcy.32
The second form of asset partitioning, defensive asset partitioning, keeps other
pools of assets together: creditors of the firm are not allowed to destroy pools of
assets that belong to the firms’ owners.
The asset separation function of bankruptcy law works in a similar vein, only it
focuses on the assets in the firm’s asset pool. Where defensive asset partitioning
separates assets of owners from the firm, bankruptcy law’s asset separation
separates the firm’s assets from claims of creditors on those assets.
This separation differs from asset stabilisation in that the assets are not protected
by the delaying of creditor claims on specific assets, but rather it allows the assets to
be sold without any claim of any creditor on those assets attached.
In this sense, bankruptcy law transforms a claim on a particular asset into a tort-
like claim for monetary compensation equal to the value of the asset. The main
value-enhancing effect of this separation is that it makes the sale of assets easier to
effectuate, thus minimising value destruction during financial distress.33
Prospective buyers need not inquire into the nature of the attached creditor claims
and are free to do with the asset whatever they think is best. This provides a setting
in which prospective buyers can bid their private full value of the asset, without the
need to value the obligations attached to it, maximising the returns to the estate.
Again, outside bankruptcy, a sale of assets is the sole province of the board of
directors, although contractual obligations imposed by a lender may limit this
discretion. In this setting, the decision to sell a key asset implies that a bilateral
agreement has been reached between the board of directors and the relevant
creditors.34 Consent can be assumed to have a price, and produce incentives for
hold-out strategies.
With the initiation of bankruptcy, asset separation enables the bankruptcy
controller to choose that deal that benefits the estate the most, instead of relegating
that decision to a particular creditor. In most cases, such a creditor will lack the
29 Baird and Rasmussen (2006), at p. 1211.
30 See U.C.C. § 9–503.
31 See U.C.C. § 9–501.
32 This shows that it is not only a common pool problem that is the foundation for bankruptcy law, as is
assumed in the creditors’ bargain theory of bankruptcy. See Baird and Jackson (1988).
33 Baird and Rasmussen (2002b), at p. 1805.
34 Baird and Rasmussen (2003), at p. 675.
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knowledge or the incentive to find out what particular sets of assets are best
packaged and sold together.
Asset stabilisation and asset separation are both needed to operate a bankruptcy
system. Stabilisation without separation and vice versa leads to inefficient results.
Without separation, stabilisation alone would make the asset sale inefficient. The
bankruptcy controller would not be able to sell the assets in the optimal package.
Creditors would try to extract privileges or rents to remove liens or attachments to
specific assets, effectively prolonging the procedure, diminishing asset values and
lowering returns to the estate. In this bargaining process, the value difference
between piecemeal liquidation and going-concern asset sale would be subject to
rent-seeking by each creditor. Any deal done by the bankruptcy controller with a
specific creditor would yield the next creditor a higher hold-out value.
Without stabilisation, separation alone would lead to an inefficient deployment of
assets. The bankruptcy controller would not be able to keep assets together or in
operation, thus making it more difficult to sell assets at a going-concern premium.
He would have to revert to a piecemeal liquidation of the estate, or at the very least a
rushed sale of the estate.35 Without stabilisation, asset separation can then add only
little value to the estate.
Both asset stabilisation and separation are necessary additions to organisational
law. Where organisational law protects pools of assets from creditor interference
outside a specific legal form, bankruptcy law protects assets within a specific legal
form, but it does so only in bankruptcy as outside bankruptcy it is the board of
directors that is responsible for the protection of the firm’s assets. Even more
importantly, these two functions are the necessary and sufficient ingredients for a
bankruptcy law system to operate efficiently. The two are essential elements of
bankruptcy law.
3 Stability and Separation by Contract?
In this section we show why it would be impossible to erect the two essential
elements of bankruptcy law with contracts. As will be shown, while asset
stabilisation and separation could be constructed voluntarily under highly stylised
conditions, under anything approaching real-world conditions the costs of doing so
would be prohibitive and the likelihood of doing so would be doubtful.
The literature on incomplete contracting identifies three elements that yield a
non-contractable situation: unobservability, unverifiability and unenforceability.
The elements are not necessarily cumulative.36 Under this literature, only if it is
impossible or very costly to use a contractual solution is it absolutely necessary to
invoke bankruptcy law.37
35 Picker (1992), at p. 528.
36 See generally Hart (1995). We deem these factors sufficiently malleable to cover practical concerns
not originally addressed by the literature.
37 Adler (1993), at p. 314. But see Warren and Westbrook (2005), at pp. 1253–54. For purposes of this
paper, we take no position as to whether this minimalist position is right as a matter of policy.
44 O. Couwenberg, S. J. Lubben
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3.1 Asset Stabilisation by Contract
In general, any contractual solution to financial distress will always fall down when
addressing involuntary creditors.38 And while the typical response is to assume such
creditors should receive some sort of priority, such a solution ignores important
ways in which priority of payment can be defeated.39
Even if we focus solely on contractual creditors, to generate asset stabilisation by
contract all creditors would need to waive their individual contractual rights to
specific assets in order to keep the assets together. Creditors would so contract if a
series of unrealistic assumptions held, namely:
• All creditors believe that the debtor’s assets are worth more as a whole;
• All creditors agree on the value of the assets;
• All creditors believe they will recover more by collective action.
If all three conditions hold, no creditor will disrupt the collective proceeding and
a contractual solution will exist.
It is here that the problems of a contractual solution manifest themselves.40 Of
course, it is improbable that different types of creditors will have homogeneous
expectations concerning the value of the firm.41 Even if they did, we should expect
that any such moment of agreement would be fleeting.
After all, if the market for the debtor’s claims is even somewhat liquid, such
agreement cannot long persist if the market is to keep functioning. But even when
claims are not traded, it is very unlikely that the expectations will stay homogeneous
as the prospects of the firm change. With that, agreement will break down as well.
Moreover, equal access to information would be vital to such a contract.42 It is
not hard to envisage the situation in which a creditor calls upon a court to argue that
misrepresentation or changes in the firm’s outlook voids the contract.43 Whether
such a claim is actually true or inspired by opportunistic motives is not important.
Such statements are unverifiable in court as the ‘true’ value of the firm is
unobservable.44
Furthermore, writing a clause in the contract that any creditor breaking the
contract needs to compensate all others for the value lost is problematic. In such
situations, the ‘true’ value of the firm is counterfactual, and thus unobservable,
unverifiable and unenforceable. Given these ex post problems, creditors will not be
38 Warren (1992), at p. 472. See also Hansmann and Kraakman (1991).
39 Ben-Ishai and Lubben (2012) (arguing that asset sales in bankruptcy can be used to defeat priority
claims).
40 See Altman (1993), at p. 10.
41 Cf. Jackson and Scott (1989), at p. 158 (‘A primary objective of any bankruptcy process is to regulate
the inherent conflicts among different groups having separate claims against a debtor’s assets and income
stream’).
42 See LoPucki (1992), at pp. 81–82.
43 See LoPucki and Whitford (1990), at pp. 194–95.
44 See Bebchuk and Chang (1992), at p. 273.
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able to construct a contract ex ante that incorporates such a shared belief concerning
the value of the firm.
Even if such a contract were feasible, creditors would have to monitor the debtor
firm and provide for monitoring of their fellow creditors. The debtor firm, or more
exactly its controlling authority, needs to make the correct economic decisions,
while creditors need to be monitored so that no one creditor breaks the contract by
extracting assets from the firm. Although the contract may specify the decisions the
controller is empowered to make, it is impossible to specify all kinds of important
operating decisions that need to be made by the controller.
The controller needs implicit or residual control rights in order to run the firm.
But creditors will be sceptical of this power. Decisions not provided for by the
express terms of the contract need to be communicated to creditors together with the
details that show that the decision was the correct one.
Apart from the inordinate amount of information that would need to be shared,
the effect this information would have on expectations concerning firm value is not
predictable. It could provide room for any creditor to demand renegotiation or
otherwise void the contract.
Monitoring also implies a sharing of information among creditors concerning
firm decisions and creditor decisions about contract compliance.45 With an increase
in the number of creditors and the types of creditor contracts involved, this
information sharing becomes increasingly costly and unwieldy. Hence, the apparent
need for representation within the firm. However, representation adds a layer to the
decision-making structure among creditors and gives rise to additional information
asymmetries and agency problems, effectively undermining the benefits of
contracting.46
The final item bulleted above – that each creditor knows he will receive no less
than what he would receive when acting on his own – mimics the actual Chapter 11
rule known as the ‘best interest of the creditors’ test.47 But it is difficult to enforce
this rule in a contractual setting.
It is built upon a counterfactual observation – the going-concern value or the
liquidation value of the specific asset.48 Although one can estimate this value, these
estimates are imprecise and vulnerable to manipulation. And these values fluctuate
over time due to wear and tear, technological changes and the economic cycle.
In short, asset stabilisation is, at a minimum, costly, or even prohibitively costly,
to organise by contract. If asset stabilisation is essential to solving corporate
financial distress, as we argue, it then has to be done by statutory law. Although
these arguments show that it is costly to organise by contract, they do not
necessarily show that statutory law is the solution.
45 Cf. Lipson (2011), at p. 1093.
46 One solution to this problem is to convert all creditor claims to equity. But one should note that this
requires a certain amount of mandatory regulation in order to solve priority issues among creditors and
asset valuation problems. At this point, the inquiry is to find out reasons why contracts cannot solve this
problem, not which type of regulation can solve that.
47 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
48 Baird and Jackson (1984), at pp. 118–19.
46 O. Couwenberg, S. J. Lubben
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For example, Robert Rasmussen has famously argued that corporate debtors
should pick a bankruptcy system ex ante by way of their corporate charter. Debtors
would be able to choose from Chapters 7 and 11 but could also waive bankruptcy
entirely or devise their own system.49
A bankruptcy system in the corporate charter avoids many of the problems of
contracting, but still suffers from several key problems. Most notably, what if the
debtor actually engages in fraud, representing the firm as a type that would benefit
from a form of bankruptcy that results in lower interest rates today, when some
other form of bankruptcy would actually better suit the firm and its creditors ex
post? What would stop creditors from overturning their prior selection by litigation,
and if such fraud were proven, how would a new bankruptcy system be chosen?
Once the fraud was exposed, the benefits of making the choice ex ante would be
gone, and the creditors’ interests would have become sufficiently diffuse so as to
make consensus on a replacement bankruptcy system impossible. Rasmussen allows
for the possibility of mid-stream changes to the corporate charter, but only with the
unanimous consent of creditors, a solution that seems destined to leave the firm
mired in hold-out problems.50
Statutory law runs into many of the same problems as contracts, or charters, but
its advantage is that it forces an imperfect solution on participants. That is,
participants lose their option to exit the arrangement through litigation, since the
arrangement is mandatory rather than voluntary.51
3.2 Asset Separation by Contract
Similarly to asset stabilisation, in order to replicate asset separation by contract,
creditors need to agree ex ante to release all rights in the debtor’s assets upon sale.
This release would need to include not only the obvious – liens – but also claims
like fraudulent transfer actions and successor liability rights.
The controller needs to have the power to decide what, when and at what price to
sell. For that he needs to have the ability to sell those assets free of any creditor
claims. If not, he will be restricted in performing his duties and miss potential value-
maximising offers.
Such freedom of action, though, generates an important agency problem the
moment the controller enters the stage.52 The controller may decide to sell all
valuable assets at artificial low prices to a company owned or controlled by him or
49 Rasmussen (1992), at p. 107.
50 Id., at p. 118. In a footnote on the same page, Rasmussen discounts the possibility of hold-out
problems, but only by assuming a unity of interest among creditors with regard to the choice of
bankruptcy system. Id., at n. 269. Given the varied interests of creditors, this simplifying assumption
seems implausible. The infighting among senior creditors in the Chrysler case provides but one recent
illustration. In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 102 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir.
2009) cert. granted, appellate judgment vacated as moot, Indiana State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler
LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009) and In re Chrysler, LLC, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010).
51 More than 70 years ago, Max Radin argued that involuntary imposition of a solution upon dissenting
creditors was the one basic element of any bankruptcy system. Radin (1940), at p. 7.
52 See LoPucki and Whitford (1993), at pp. 683–84.
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any other preferred party. These sorts of fraudulent transactions would seriously
undermine the contractual agreement creditors need to reach among themselves.
To prevent such fraud, the controller needs to be restricted to asset sales that
provide at least the present value of the claims against the assets, while assuring
creditors that they could do no better when acting on their own.53 Such an assurance
prevents an opportunistic sale of assets by the controller.
He needs to present a better deal than anyone else might present. This requires
information concerning the value and price of the assets to be sold and whether the
offer is the best one on the table and that no creditor has a better alternative. As with
asset stabilisation, this information needs to be shared and creditors need to form
homogeneous perceptions in order to agree with the deal.54
Although such a contract may prevent an opportunistic sale by the controller, it
opens up the possibility of opportunistic hold-up by creditors. This is especially so
when a creditor might indeed fetch a higher price for a particular asset but the set of
assets together fetches an even higher price. Obviously, a bargain might be struck by
transferring part of this premium to that specific creditor. This transfer is ex post
efficient, but it generates an incentive for other creditors to hold out as well.
The main source of this problem has been discussed above with regard to asset
stabilisation: it presupposes that the asset values can be established and agreed upon
among the creditors. In short, asset separation is at best very costly to construct by
contract.
One further, global element to consider in discussing the contractual solution is
the cost of drafting the contract. The discussion above points out that this drafting
will be a complex assignment, yielding a document that might be either wafer-thin –
providing ample residual decision-making power for the controller – or massively
large – documenting all possible contingencies, information-sharing responsibilities
and penalties for voiding it.
The wafer-thin version implies a very robust ex post governance mechanism to
settle diverging expectations, handle opportunistic actions and provide information.
The vastly large one implies a very robust monitoring system to make sure
everybody is living up to the contractual obligations. But other costs come up as
well with regard to a fully specified agreement.
First, someone must do the drafting. The most obvious candidate is the board.55
However, from the creditors’ perspective, the board is not an impartial agent in the
drafting process at the beginning of the contractual relation, and certainly not at the
moment of financial distress. The board will have its own agenda, motives and
incentives, which might be at least partly antagonistic to at least certain types of
creditors.
Furthermore, this contract must be accepted by all new creditors that interact
with the firm. These drafting costs have to be added to the total cost of the
contractual solution.
53 This latter element is a copy of the agreement creditors have to reach for asset stabilisation.
54 Skeel (1993), at p. 507.
55 Obviously, the board will delegate the actual drafting to agents, but in the text we assume that such
agents fully reflect the interests of their principals.
48 O. Couwenberg, S. J. Lubben
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In short, the contractual alternative exists largely as a thought experiment. For
any real firm, with a real capital structure, the impossibility of achieving asset
stabilisation and asset separation by contract seems self-evident.
4 Essential Elements of Corporate Bankruptcy Law
Having thus demonstrated that asset stabilisation and asset separation must be
established by statute, we next turn to the aspects of bankruptcy law that support
these two essential elements. There are many features of Chapter 11 and other
corporate bankruptcy systems that are prominent, even convenient. But we argue
that they are not all essential to the basic functioning of corporate bankruptcy law.
We first consider the elements that are necessary to achieve asset stabilisation
before turning to asset separation.
4.1 Asset Stabilisation
Most obviously, to achieve asset stabilisation individual creditor action must be
thwarted.56 This means that a collective procedure superseding and subsuming
individual actions is essential. In addition, the statute must guarantee that no one
gets better treatment than contractually bargained for.
4.1.1 A Stay on Creditors
The collective process most often supplants individual creditor rights by imposing a
stay. For example, the filing of a bankruptcy petition often creates a bankruptcy
estate, from which collective recoveries are paid.57 The viability of that estate is
then preserved by an automatic stay imposed by statute on all creditors within the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.58
But the duration of the collective procedure and the stay varies by jurisdiction.
Asset stabilisation could be achieved by a judicial stay,59 or by transfer of the assets
to some new, protected entity.60 While exceptions to the prohibition on individual
action are inevitable – nobody would support insolvency as an exemption from
general criminal law – these exceptions must be drawn as narrowly as possible.61
Broad exceptions to the collective process ultimately undermine the process and
encourage overinvestment in evasion.62 Moreover, at a policy level a jurisdiction
needs to decide whether there should be a collective process or not. Broad
exceptions to the process, like the exemption of secured creditors that exists in many
56 Woo (2011), at p. 1657.
57 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
58 E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 and Article L622-21 of the French Commercial Code.
59 Canadian Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act § 11.02.
60 See Buckley (1994), at pp. 739–41.
61 Baker (2010), at p. 1330.
62 Lubben (2009), at p. 447.
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jurisdictions, amount to a waiver of the collective process, especially when the
creditor in question has a claim on vital assets.63
While it is sometimes suggested that a creditor with a claim on all the debtor’s
assets will have the proper incentives to consider their value as a whole, this only
holds for creditors with claims at the edge of the debtor’s going-concern value. If we
instead assume that senior creditors routinely over-collateralise their position, then
they have no incentive to consider possible externalities that their collection actions
will create. Rather, the creditor will prefer the collection method that minimises cost
while still resulting in full recovery. This may or may not impair overall
efficiency.64
An additional inefficiency here results from an oversecured creditor’s ability to
provide additional financing to the debtor firm. The creditor then eats into the
surplus in collateral value that is available to other creditors. This leads to a less
timely petition for bankruptcy protection.65 And if bankruptcy law is essential for
stabilising asset values, doing so sooner rather than later is likely to result in an
efficiency gain.
Moreover, even if the creditor is under-collateralised but has a claim on a vital
asset, an exception to the collective process allows the creditor to extract rents from
other, more junior creditors. The exception gives the preferred creditor the ability to
threaten the recoveries of other, junior creditors and thus demand part of their
recovery. It seems doubtful as a matter of policy that extortion of this sort should be
facilitated by insolvency law.
Asset stability is also promoted by discouraging runs on the debtor’s assets.66
Thus, many reorganisation systems provide that claims paid in the days before
formal proceedings are commenced will be treated as part of the proceedings.67 This
prevents claimants’ efforts to effectuate a socially inefficient, but personally
efficient collection of the debtor’s assets.
But stopping individual action is not sufficient to achieve asset stabilisation.
Asset stability also requires prohibitions on contractual efforts to undermine the
collective process.68 Contractual penalties, insolvency termination rights, or
creditor protections that activate only upon commencement of the insolvency
process have the same effect as creditor efforts to extract individual assets from
the debtor.
63 E.g., the Dutch Bankruptcy Law exempts secured creditors from the procedure (Art. 57).
64 Ayotte and Morrison (2009).
65 Couwenberg and Jong (2006), provide empirical evidence of such over-collateralisation and financing
outcomes in a liquidation-based bankruptcy system. The other side of the coin is that financing is
potentially more expensive when a system is geared towards reorganisation.
66 Countryman (1985), at p. 748.
67 See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (providing that debtors may recover preferential transfers). See also Article 134 of
the Icelandic Bankruptcy Act and UK Insolvency Act 1986, Section 239.
68 See Schwarcz (1999), at p. 552.
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4.1.2 Funding Liquidity Needs
Liquidity is also an inevitable prerequisite to maintaining asset values in most
firms.69 Employees who continue working for the firm must receive their pay
packets, vendors’ invoices must be paid and assets must be maintained.
Some of the debtor’s liquidity needs can be met by foregoing interest payments
to bondholders, but suppliers not operating under long-term contracts will make it
clear that future deliveries will require cash on delivery, or other forms of security,
if the delivery comes at all. That is, the debtor’s increasing need for cash often
swamps the benefit of suspending debt payments.
Thus, to achieve asset stability the insolvency system must provide for the
liquidity needs of the debtor firm.70 At minimum, this element of the insolvency
system must provide that post-insolvency claims are entitled to priority over pre-
insolvency claims.
Without this basic protection, new money would benefit old creditors, making
such new injections of cash extremely unlikely.71 Thus, the system must provide
both temporal priority and priority as to rights in specific debtor assets.
Providing priority in the debtor’s assets necessarily unleashes several other
questions that turn on the basic question of ‘how far should this go?’ For example,
in the United States it is impermissible to provide priority rights in a piece of
collateral if doing so will make a prior creditor uncollateralised.72 It is thought that
such treatment is required by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which
protects property from being taken by the government without just compensation.
Other jurisdictions may prioritise creditors in different ways. In a general sense,
the key question is one of balancing the benefits of any subordination ex post against
the likely ex ante effects.73 Conversely, and probably more commonly, many
jurisdictions presently provide post-bankruptcy funding with a payment priority, but
no security interest in the debtor’s assets.
Stabilisation also requires recognition of the soft power that many claimants have
with regard to debtors.74 Employees may refuse to work if their past claims are not
addressed. Trade creditors may legally withhold future inputs if they have no
contractual obligation to make future deliveries.75 And creditors in foreign
jurisdictions might ignore prohibitions on individual creditor action. The liquidity
that is used to stabilise the business may also be needed to addresses these issues if
doing so will preserve the overall value of the estate.76
69 Resnick (2005), at p. 185.
70 Lipson (2009), at p. 1621.
71 Myers (1977).
72 11 U.S.C. §364(d)(1)(B). See also the Canadian equivalent at Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act
§ 11.2.
73 Rasmussen (1992), at pp. 64–65.
74 Lubben (2005), at pp. 857–58.
75 In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 825 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).
76 See Dickerson (2009), at p. 910.
Corporate Bankruptcy Law 51
123
4.1.3 Distribution Rules
Addressing liquidity needs, especially when considered in light of the soft power
that creditors might possess, will often lead to changes in the normal liquidation
distribution scheme. For example, while the United States nominally follows the
‘absolute priority rule’ in both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11, in Chapter 11 the decision
to assume contracts or pay providers of vital inputs will result in full payment of
those claimants despite what they might have been entitled to in a liquidation. This
suggests a point to which we return in our discussion of asset separation below:
namely, that the distribution rules for reorganisation might necessarily deviate from
those of liquidation.
The reorganisation system might incorporate the broader set of distribution rules,
with possible deviations specified as needed to achieve the specific goals of
reorganisation. For example, in the United States, a debtor who wants to assume a
currently beneficial contract must cure any past defaults. This has the effect of
granting the counterparty better treatment than other unsecured claimants, since its
claims get paid in full.77 In essence, if the debtor wishes to treat the contract as an
asset, rather than a claim for damages, he must fully perform on the contract.78
In liquidation such a rule represents a policy judgment that the gains from the
contract should be shared among all creditors, rather than conferring a windfall on
the counterparty that would otherwise obtain a right to terminate.79 In reorganisa-
tion, such a rule avoids the going-concern value destruction that could result from
termination of agreements, especially given that such value destruction is apt to be
overall inefficient.80
Moreover, the rule eliminates the exercise of hold-out power by the counterparty
and thus furthers the cause of asset stabilisation. The counterparty is given the full
benefit of performance on the contract, and the debtor is able to maintain its asset
pool’s integrity.
Such a rule deviates from the normal liquidation priorities, where all unsecured
creditors receive equal payment.81 But using this rule is necessary to recognise the
going-concern value of the debtor in reorganisation. And counterparties know that
such treatment is likely to occur, and are thus able to price their reduced hold-up
rights ex ante.82
In short, clear distribution rules, whatever they may be, are all that is required.83
And stabilisation must occur to preserve asset value, not hold-up power.84
77 Assuming the debtor is insolvent.
78 Westbrook (1989), at p. 243.
79 Fuller and Perdue (1937), at pp. 384–85.
80 Adler (1992), at p. 455.
81 Hynes (2011), at p. 209.
82 See Tung (1996), at p. 1730.
83 Bebchuk and Fried (1997), at p. 1286.
84 See White (1994).
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This discussion also highlights the basic point that some parties have hold-up
power in a reorganisation, and often the reorganisation process will need to simply
acknowledge and move past that power to obtain true asset stabilisation.
4.1.4 Monitoring the Estate
More generally, to avoid the agency problems inherent in such a system of priority
financing, an independent monitor or trustee85 must oversee the process.86 Such a
monitor ensures that the new financing is not a disguised preference for specific
claimants or management.87 This role can take the form of either a direct
examination of the value of the debtor’s assets, or of simply preserving the ability of
parties to challenge the valuation issue at some point in the future.88
The monitor can also resolve disputes among new and incumbent lenders,
particularly with regard to any rules that limit the priority of new financing.
Apart from these limited functions, a monitor is also the economical solution to
the agency problems discussed above. All participants are confronted with skewed
incentives and – when at the helm – with the ability to appropriate firm value. A
monitor mitigates this problem, although imperfectly as incentives also undermine
his impartiality.
Creditors might contract for the monitor, but his job description should be
provided for in statute, including limits to his liability. This ensures that a monitor
works for the benefit of all, but more importantly not for a specific creditor class. It
also implies that the incentive scheme for a monitor should not be too high-
powered, as this would skew his decision making. Limits to liability are needed in
order to ensure an economically correct risk tolerance and to elicit experts to work
as monitors. The selection of such a monitor can be market based, leaning on
reputation effects, or can take place in courts.
The monitor might take the form of a committee with duties to a larger class of
claimants.89 In such a case, the law likely must provide for the payment of the
committee’s expenses from either the debtor or the class. Otherwise the committee
presents an obvious free-rider problem.
But instead of a committee, the monitor might be some other independent
official. This avoids the common problem of conflicts among classes of claimants, a
problem that many have argued has become more common with the advent of new,
more complex financial instruments and trading strategies.90
In jurisdictions with court-based insolvency systems, the monitor might be
subject to court oversight. The general challenge with such a structure is to avoid the
creation of new agency problems that undermine the benefits of a monitor. If the
85 Here, monitor is used generically, and not with specific reference to the Canadian monitor under the
CCAA.
86 Westbrook (2004), at pp. 825–27.
87 Cf. Adler (1992), at pp. 446–55.
88 See McKenzie (2010), at p. 778.
89 See Bussel (1996), at p. 1579.
90 Baird and Rasmussen (2010) at p. 665.
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monitor is too ‘pure’ – that is, entirely disinterested in the case – the monitor’s
primary motivations may tend towards his own compensation, at the expense of an
efficient reorganisation process.
4.2 Asset Separation
To achieve asset separation, a reorganisation system needs a mechanism that cleanly
detaches a firm’s liabilities, in all forms, from its assets.91 This could be achieved by
a discharge provision,92 in the sense that upon fulfilling certain conditions all debt is
wiped out and the debtor is allowed to resume operations unencumbered.93 But a
discharge provision is not vital so long as the system provides that the new owner of
the assets, which may be the post-bankruptcy firm, has clean title.94
This simply requires a legal mechanism for leaving all pre-distress debts behind,
converting any obligation that would otherwise run with the assets into a tort-like
claim for money damages.95 The key is that the process should not destroy value, or
redistribute it in a way that is generally inefficient.96
In theory, asset separation can be achieved outside of bankruptcy. For example,
under Delaware corporate law, the debtor firm could sell some part of its assets.97
The normal American rule is that an asset purchaser takes free from the seller’s
liabilities – the seller’s creditors have their remedy against the sale proceeds.98
But there are several important exceptions to this basic rule. There are myriad
forms of ‘successor liability’ that serve to reverse the presumption.99 And an asset
sale might be challenged under fraudulent transfer law, particularly if the buyer fails
to pay ‘reasonably equivalent value’.100
A corporate bankruptcy system replaces these rights, and other similar challenges
to distressed asset sales, with a collective proceeding that serves to safeguard the
same basic interests. Thus, while the process hands the buyer cleaner title, it must
also ensure that doing so does not result in expropriation.
91 Keating (1994), at p. 546.
92 See generally McCoid (1996).
93 Brubaker (1997), at p. 1004.
94 See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding the sale of substantially all
of ‘Old Chrysler’s’ assets to ‘New Chrysler’ as ‘[c]onsistent with an underlying purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code – maximizing the value of the bankrupt estate’), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State
Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009).
95 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (stating trustee may sell § 363(a)(b) property ‘free and clear of any interest in
such property’ subject to enumerated conditions and limitations); Warburton (2010), at p. 581.
96 See Jacoby and Janger (2014), at p. 914 (‘[W]hen the … leverage is used to alter the relative
distribution, the sale is not Pareto optimal. Efficiency is being achieved at the expense of one or more
holders of claims or interests.’); LoPucki and Doherty (2007) (arguing that American 363 sales result in
lower recoveries for creditors than traditional plans).
97 Del. Gen. Corp. Code § 271.
98 Marks v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Ct. App. 1986).
99 Franklin v. USX Corp., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11 (Ct. App. 2001) (summarising exceptions).
100 6 Del. C. §§ 1301–1311.
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This suggests that separation also requires distribution rules. Payment of the
claims against the debtor should proceed by clearly defined rules, but these rules
need not be the absolute priority rule that so dominates Anglo-American discussions
of insolvency.101 Instead, it is simply important that the rules are known ex ante,
whatever they may be.102
Asset separation necessarily follows asset stabilisation, and the choices made
during the stabilisation phase influence recoveries upon separation. As noted in the
discussion of stabilisation, as part of that initial process the debtor (or the monitor/
trustee) will often pay creditors outside of the normal distribution rules. The
debtor’s discretion in this regard is checked by an oversight mechanism.
That is, the asset separation process must be conducted in a manner that will
result in the highest possible proceeds. A neutral party – be it a judge or a trustee103
– is needed to ensure that this happens.104
Nonetheless, because the debtor’s discretion involves a good deal of business
judgment – something courts and other monitors are often ill-equipped to exercise –
this oversight is rightly apt to be ‘light’. And in most instances oversight will
ultimately rely on stakeholders to surface issues of concern, since the ultimate
distribution to stakeholders will be influenced by decisions the debtor makes while
stabilising his assets.
This then highlights the basic notion that notice, participation rights and
oversight are also key attributes that must accompany any asset separation tool.
In general, the mechanics of any particular jurisdiction’s asset separation
instrument is apt to be highly dependent on the local property law. In the United
States, property law is highly fractured: each state has its own law, while real and
personal property are distinct areas of the law, and in many cases motor vehicles
provide yet another source of relevant law.
An asset sale of a large business in the United States thus involves a high degree
of transaction costs. Not surprisingly, the US corporate bankruptcy system seeks to
overcome these costs by consolidating power over the asset transfer in a single
bankruptcy judge. In jurisdictions with more streamlined property law, the
incremental gains from adoption of specific US procedures are apt to be minimal.
The key goal of asset separation is to provide mechanisms to overcome barriers
to asset transfers and attempts by individual creditors to appropriate value through
hold-ups. Discharges and other provisions that ‘cleanse’ assets are obvious pieces of
asset separation.
Other provisions, like those overturning contractual prohibitions on asset
transfer, also have a role to play.105 After all, such prohibitions are often just a
means for demanding a side payment in exchange for consent to the transaction. On
101 Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 207–08 (1988); Coffee (1995), at p. 1458;
LoPucki (1996), at p. 11.
102 See Gilmore (1963), at p. 1344.
103 Frank (1941), at p. 317 (‘[R]eorganization is only in its superficial aspects litigation inter partis and
fundamentally it is an administrative problem of business and finance.’).
104 Morrison (2007), at p. 411.
105 11 U.S.C. § 365(f).
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an individual basis, such side payments represent an allocation of gains amongst
two parties. When aggregated across an entire firm, however, such payments
represent friction costs that destroy going-concern value.
5 The Non-Essential Elements of Corporate Bankruptcy
Comparison of the foregoing with current Chapter 11, or any other similar corporate
reorganisation system, will quickly reveal that much of the present law is not essential.106
For example, Chapter 11 contains a set of well-developed rules regarding
reorganisation plans. Statutory provisions cover the solicitation of votes on such
plans,107 the voting and classification rules,108 and the rule for judicial confirmation
of plans.109 But is it really vital to have reorganisation plans?
The sale of the debtor’s good assets to a new legal entity can preserve the going-
concern value of the assets. At that point, distribution of the sale proceeds could just
as easily occur under a liquidation structure as under a plan.110
Arguably, the general distribution rules are not a necessary part of the reorganisa-
tion system, but rather a necessary part of the larger debtor-creditor system. All debtors
and creditors need to know where they stand in any sort of collection action.111
Note also that asset separation and asset stability do not necessarily require
anything like the American ‘debtor in possession’ system – which leaves incumbent
management in control.112 Certainly, existing management might be better able to
achieve these ends, but that is a question of degree and subject to much debate, and
our goal is to delineate the essential.113
Although rules for a reorganisation plan are thus not essential to bankruptcy law, if
for whatever reason participants want one, the essential element is the upholding of
the previously announced distribution rules. Upholding the rules typically compli-
cates the process as it requires valuation of the firm and its claims.114 The fact that
this is needed, however, does not mean that it is needed to specify rules for this. The
alternative – selling the assets – provides the setting against which any proposal is
evaluated.115 Rules may reduce haggling costs via a reduction of potential conflicts,
106 Finkelstein (1993), at p. 2229 (arguing that many justifications for Chapter 11 are actually
justifications for the automatic stay).
107 See generally Betker et al. (1999).
108 Skeel (1992), at pp. 525–26.
109 11 U.S.C. § 1129. See also Tung (1996), at pp. 1714–29.
110 See Baird (1987b), at p. 820; Jackson (1982), at p. 893; Mooney (2004), at p. 1053.
111 Warren (1987), at p. 792.
112 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a); Harner (2011), at p. 499.
113 Armour et al. (2002), at pp. 1728–30. See also Couwenberg and Lubben (2013). In that paper we
argue that a debtor-in-possession system provides an efficient incentive to file early for bankruptcy. This
argument follows from an analysis of bankruptcy’s shadow on managerial behaviour, it is, though, not
essential for asset stabilisation or separation.
114 Skeel (1998), at p. 1377.
115 See Schwartz (2005), at pp. 1243–44.
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but experience in the United States shows that any delineation or adjustment therein
creates room for redistributive actions and even costly lobbying of Congress.116 It
does not follow therefore that such rules are efficiency enhancing, let alone essential.
Although economic cycles might diminish or even eliminate first- and second-
best buyers for distressed assets,117 it does not mean that rules for reorganisation are
essential. To our minds, asset stabilisation and separation, however created, are the
more important elements.
The argument that the reorganisation option is the solution to a lack of
possibilities to sell is not necessarily valid. Even in a hypothetical sale the firm
needs liquidity, which might not be forthcoming in a downturn. Selling to a second-
best buyer is then a better option. Furthermore, asset stabilisation does not require
an immediate sale; it might be postponed, thus waiting for better options. Indefinite
postponing creates adverse competitive effects, but will not happen easily as it will
be difficult to secure financing for a new long-term strategy in bankruptcy.118
Plans are one possible collective solution to financial distress, but with sufficient
financing and rules to govern hold-out problems, sales of the debtors’ assets would
seem to work just as well.
Creditors’ committees were once considered vital to reorganisation, since small
creditors were too often loath to incur the costs of participation.119 There is much
wisdom in the basic idea of including creditors in the reorganisation, but the advent
of modern finance has also called into question the notion that creditors’ incentives
are easily understood.120 As such, the ability of a committee to represent all
unsecured creditors might be doubted, and we therefore do not deem such an
instrument essential.121
Similarly, we doubt whether the various statutory priorities,122 caps on claims,123
rules for dealing with special contracts,124 special collateral,125 and special debtors
are essential.126 Politically inevitable perhaps, but not essential.
116 Ayotte and Morrison (2009) and Roe and Tung (2013).
117 See Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
118 Some empirical studies on different systems show that asset sales can happen rather quickly,
especially when compared to reorganisation procedures. See for non-US studies, e.g., Couwenberg and
Jong (2008) and Thorburn (2000). However, for the US, the evidence is much less conclusive, see, e.g.,
Bris et al. (2006).
119 Adams (1993), at p. 614; Harner and Marincic (2011), at p. 765; Klee and Shaffer (1993), at p. 1041.
120 Hu and Black (2008), at pp. 728–35, and Lubben (2007), at p. 407.
121 Cf. Lubben (2012b), at p. 470 (finding that committees contribute to the direct cost of
reorganisation).
122 11 U.S. C. § 507. Statutory priorities just change the distributive scheme, might result in haggling
costs, rent-seeking or even runs when ill-structured, but are not essential for asset stabilisation or
separation.
123 11 U.S.C. § 502(b). Capping claims alters the distribution, while settling especially large claims, e.g.,
the Texaco Pennzoil litigation, might lead to huge haggling costs. See Cutler and Summers (1988).
124 11 U.S.C. §§ 555, 556, 1113.
125 11 U.S.C. § 1110. The exception might be cash collateral, which is especially at risk of expropriation.
11 U.S.C. § 363(a), (c).
126 11 U.S.C. §§ 1161–1174 (railroad reorganisation provisions).
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6 Conclusion
Our goal is not to doubt the ‘richness and elasticity’ of corporate bankruptcy,
particularly in the United States.127 There might be myriad policy reasons why any
particular bankruptcy system might include particular features.
Our aim is instead to identify the minimum. We argue that there is a core of
corporate bankruptcy – asset separation and asset stability – that parties cannot
achieve alone, no matter how robust their contract law and drafting skills.
As such, it is this core that must be the basis for any sensible corporate
insolvency system. Beyond that, features of the system are a matter of policy and
politics.
Understanding where the core is, however, helps to focus policy makers’
attention on the choices involved in structuring an insolvency system. And it leads
away from the notion that Chapter 11 must be the standard against which all other
laws are measured.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
References
Adams ES (1993) Governance in Chapter 11 reorganizations: reducing costs, improving results. Boston
Univ Law Rev 73:581
Adler BE (1992) Bankruptcy and risk allocation. Cornell Law Rev 77:439
Adler BE (1993) Financial and political theories of American corporate bankruptcy. Stanf Law Rev
45:311
Altman EA (1993) Evaluating the Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization process. Columbia Bus Law Rev 1
Armour J et al (2002) Corporate ownership structure and the evolution of bankruptcy law: lessons from
the United Kingdom. Vanderbilt Law Rev 55:1699
Ayotte KM, Morrison ER (2009) Creditor control and conflict in Chapter 11. J Leg Anal 1:511
Ayotte K, Skeel DA Jr (2006) An efficiency-based explanation for current corporate reorganization
practice. Univ Chic Law Rev 73:425
Bainbridge SM (2003) Director primacy: the means and ends of corporate governance. Northwest Univ
Law Rev 97:547
Baird DG (1987a) A world without bankruptcy. Law Contemp Probl 50:173
Baird DG (1987b) Loss distribution, forum shopping, and bankruptcy: a reply to Warren. Univ Chic Law
Rev 54:815
Baird DG (1993) Revisiting auctions in Chapter 11. J Law Econ 36:633
Baird DG (1998) Bankruptcy’s uncontested axioms. Yale Law J 108:573
Baird DG, Casey AJ (2013) No exit? Withdrawal rights and the law of corporate reorganizations.
Columbia Law Rev 113:1
Baird DG, Jackson TH (1984) Corporate reorganization and the treatment of diverse ownership interests:
a comment on adequate protection of secured creditors in bankruptcy. Univ Chic Law Rev 51:97
Baird DG, Jackson TH (1988) Bargaining after the fall and the contours of the absolute priority rule. Univ
Chic Law Rev 55:738
Baird DG, Rasmussen RK (2002a) The end of bankruptcy. Stanf Law Rev 55:751
Baird DG, Rasmussen RK (2002b) Four (or five) easy lessons from Enron. Vanderbilt Law Rev 55:1787
Baird DG, Rasmussen RK (2003) Chapter 11 at twilight. Stanf Law Rev 56:673
127 Gelpern (2012), at p. 893.
58 O. Couwenberg, S. J. Lubben
123
Baird DG, Rasmussen RK (2006) Private debt and the missing lever of corporate governance. Univ Pa
Law Rev 154:1209
Baird DG, Rasmussen RK (2010) Antibankruptcy. Yale Law J 119:648
Baker CM (2010) Regulating the invisible: the case of over-the-counter derivatives. Notre Dame Law
Rev 85:1287
Bebchuk LA (1988) A new approach to corporate reorganizations. Harv Law Rev 101:775
Bebchuk LA, Chang HF (1992) Bargaining and the division of value in corporate reorganization. J Law
Econ Organ 8:253
Bebchuk LA, Fried JM (1997) The uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy: further
thoughts and a reply to critics. Cornell Law Rev 82:1279
Ben-Ishai S, Lubben SJ (2012) Involuntary creditors and corporate bankruptcy. UBCL Rev 45:253
Betker BL et al (1999) ‘Warm with sunny skies’: disclosure statement forecasts. Am Bankruptcy Law J
73:809
Bratton WW Jr (1989) The ‘nexus of contracts’ corporation: a critical appraisal. Cornell Law Rev 74:407
Bris A, Welch I, Zhu N (2006) The costs of bankruptcy: Chapter 7 liquidation versus Chapter 11
reorganization. J Financ 59:1253
Brubaker R (1997) Bankruptcy injunctions and complex litigation: a critical reappraisal of non-debtor
releases in Chapter 11 reorganizations. Univ Ill Law Rev 959
Buckley FH (1994) The American stay. South Calif Interdiscip Law J 3:733
Bussel DJ (1996) Coalition-building through bankruptcy creditors’ committees. UCLA Law Rev 43:1547
Clark RC (1981) The interdisciplinary study of legal evolution. Yale Law J 90:1238
Coase RH (1937) The nature of the firm. Economica 4:386
Coffee JC Jr (1995) Class wars: the dilemma of the mass tort class action. Columbia Law Rev 95:1343
Countryman V (1985) The concept of a voidable preference in bankruptcy. Vanderbilt Law Rev 38:713
Couwenberg O, de Jong A (2006) It takes two to tango: an empirical tale of distressed firms and assisting
banks. Int Rev Law Econ 26:429
Couwenberg O, de Jong A (2008) Costs and recovery rates in the Dutch liquidation-based bankruptcy
system. Eur J Law Econ 26:105
Couwenberg O, Lubben SJ (2013) Solving creditor problems in the twilight zone: superfluous law and
inadequate private solutions. Int J L Econ 34:61
Cutler DM, Summers LH (1988) The costs of conflict resolution and financial distress: evidence from the
Texaco-Pennzoil litigation. RAND J Econ 19:157
Dickerson AM (2009) Privatizing ethics in corporate reorganizations. Minn Law Rev 93:875
Dodd EM Jr (1932) For whom are corporate managers trustees? Harv Law Rev 45:1145
Easterbrook FH (1990) Is corporate bankruptcy efficient? J Financ Econ 27:411
Eisenberg T, Sundgren S (1997) Is Chapter 11 too favorable to debtors? Evidence from abroad. Cornell
Law Rev 82:1532
Eisenberg T, Tagashira S (1994) Should we abolish Chapter 11? The evidence from Japan. J Leg Stud
23:111
Finkelstein C (1993) Financial distress as a noncooperative game: a proposal for overcoming obstacles to
private workouts. Yale Law J 102:2205
Fish JE (2010) The overstated promise of corporate governance. Univ Chic Law Rev 77:923
Frank J (1941) Epithetical jurisprudence and the work of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the
administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. N Y Univ Law Q Rev 18:317
Fuller LL, Perdue WR Jr (1937) The reliance interest in contract damages: 2. Yale Law J 46:373
Gelpern A (2012) Bankruptcy, backwards: the problem of quasi-sovereign debt. Yale Law J 121:888
Gilmore G (1963) The purchase money priority. Harv Law Rev 76:1333
Hansmann H, Kraakman R (1991) Toward unlimited shareholder liability for corporate torts. Yale Law J
100:1879
Hansmann H, Kraakman R (2000) The essential role of organizational law. Yale Law J 110:387
Hansmann H, Kraakman R (2001) The end of history for corporate law. Georget Law J 89:439
Harner MM (2011) The search for an unbiased fiduciary in corporate reorganizations. Notre Dame Law
Rev 86:469
Harner MM, Marincic J (2011) Committee capture? An empirical analysis of the role of creditors’
committees in business reorganizations. Vanderbilt Law Rev 64:749
Hart O (1995) Firms, contracts and financial structure. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Hu HTC, Black BS (2008) Equity and debt decoupling and empty voting II: importance and extensions.
Univ Pa Law Rev 156:625
Corporate Bankruptcy Law 59
123
Hu HTC, Westbrook JL (2007) Abolition of the corporate duty to creditors. Columbia Law Rev 107:1321
Hynes RM (2011) Reorganization as redemption. Va Law Bus Rev 6:183
Jackson TH (1982) Bankruptcy, non-bankruptcy entitlements, and the creditors’ bargain. Yale Law J
91:857
Jackson TH, Scott RE (1989) On the nature of bankruptcy: an essay on bankruptcy sharing and the
creditors’ bargain. Va Law Rev 75:155
Jacoby MB, Janger EJ (2014) Ice cube bonds: allocating the price of process in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Yale Law J 123:862
Keating D (1994) The continuing puzzle of collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy. William
Mary Law Rev 35:503
Klee KN, Shaffer KJ (1993) Creditors’ committees under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. SC Law
Rev 44:995
Lawless RM, Warren E (2005) The myth of the disappearing business bankruptcy. Calif Law Rev 93:743
Lipson JC (2009) The shadow bankruptcy system. Boston Univ Law Rev 89:1609
Lipson JC (2011) Governance in the breach: controlling creditor opportunism. South Calif Law Rev
84:1035
LoPucki LM (1992) Strange visions in a strange world: a reply to professors Bradley and Rosenzweig.
Mich Law Rev 91:79
LoPucki LM (1996) The death of liability. Yale Law J 106:1
LoPucki LM, Doherty JW (2007) Bankruptcy fire sales. Michigan Law Rev 106:1
LoPucki LM, Whitford WC (1990) Bargaining over equity’s share in the bankruptcy reorganization of
large, publicly held companies. Univ Pa Law Rev 139:125
LoPucki LM, Whitford WC (1993) Corporate governance in the bankruptcy reorganization of large,
publicly held companies. Univ Pa Law Rev 141:669
Lubben SJ (2004) Railroad receiverships and modern bankruptcy theory. Cornell Law Rev 89:1420
Lubben SJ (2005) The ‘new and improved’ Chapter 11. Ky Law J 93:839
Lubben SJ (2007) Credit derivatives and the future of Chapter 11. Am Bankruptcy Law J 81:405
Lubben SJ (2009) Systemic risk and Chapter 11. Temple Law Rev 82:433
Lubben SJ (2012a) Transaction simplicity. Columbia Law Rev Sidebar 112:194
Lubben SJ (2012b) The Chapter 11 attorneys. Am Bankruptcy Law J 86:447
Markell BA (1991) Owners, auctions, and absolute priority in bankruptcy reorganizations. Stanf Law Rev
44:69
McCoid JC II (1996) Discharge: the most important development in bankruptcy history. Am Bankruptcy
Law J 70:163
McKenzie TA (2010) Judicial independence, autonomy, and the bankruptcy courts. Stanf Law Rev
62:747
Mooney CW Jr (2004) A normative theory of bankruptcy law: bankruptcy as (is) civil procedure. Wash
Lee Law Rev 61:931
Morrison ER (2007) Bankruptcy decision making: an empirical study of continuation bias in small-
business bankruptcies. J Law Econ 50:381
Myers SC (1977) Determinants of corporate borrowing. J Financ Econ 5:147
Ondersma C (2013) Shadow banking and financial distress: the treatment of ‘money-claims’ in
bankruptcy. Columbia Bus Law Rev 79
Picker RC (1992) Voluntary petitions and the creditors’ bargain. Univ Cincinnati Law Rev 61:519
Radin Max (1940) The nature of bankruptcy. Univ Pa Law Rev 89:1
Rasmussen RK (1992) Debtor’s choice: a menu approach to corporate bankruptcy. Tex Law Rev 71:51
Resnick AN (2005) The future of the doctrine of necessity and critical-vendor payments in Chapter 11
cases. Boston Coll Law Rev 47:183
Roe MJ (1983) Bankruptcy and debt: a new model for corporate reorganization. Columbia Law Rev
83:527
Roe MJ (2011) The derivatives market’s payment priorities as financial crisis accelerator. Stanf Law Rev
63:539
Roe MJ, Skeel DA (2010) Assessing the Chrysler bankruptcy. Mich Law Rev 108:727
Roe MJ, Tung F (2013) Breach bankruptcy priority: how rent-seeking upends the creditors’ bargain. Va L
Rev 99:1235
Romano R (1989) Answering the wrong question: the tenuous case for mandatory corporate laws.
Columbia Law Rev 89:1599
Schwarcz SL (1999) Rethinking freedom of contract: a bankruptcy paradigm. Tex Law Rev 77:515
60 O. Couwenberg, S. J. Lubben
123
Schwartz A (1998) A contract theory approach to business bankruptcy. Yale Law J 107:1807
Schwartz A (2005) A normative theory of business bankruptcy. Va Law Rev 91:1199
Scott RE (1986) Through bankruptcy with the creditors’ bargain heuristic. Univ Chic Law Rev 53:690
Shleifer A, Vishny RW (1992) Liquidation values and debt capacity: a market equilibrium approach.
J Financ 47:1343
Simkovic M (2009) Secret liens and the financial crisis of 2008. Am Bankruptcy Law J 83:253
Skeel DA Jr (1992) The nature and effect of corporate voting in Chapter 11 reorganization cases. Va Law
Rev 78:461
Skeel DA Jr (1993) Markets, courts, and the brave new world of bankruptcy theory. Wis Law, Rev 465
Skeel DA Jr (1994) Rethinking the line between corporate law and corporate bankruptcy. Tex Law Rev
72:471
Skeel DA Jr (1998) An evolutionary theory of corporate law and corporate bankruptcy. Vanderbilt Law
Rev 51:1325
Skeel DA Jr (2003) Creditors’ ball: the ‘new’ new corporate governance in Chapter 11. Univ Pa Law Rev
152:917
Stout LA (2007) The mythical benefits of shareholder control. Va Law Rev 93:789
Thorburn KS (2000) Bankruptcy auctions: costs, debt recovery, and firm survival. J Financ Econ 58:337
Tung F (1996) Confirmation and claims trading. Northwest Univ Law Rev 90:1684
Tung F (2009) Leverage in the board room: the unsung influence of private lenders in corporate
governance. UCLA Law Rev 57:115
Warburton AJ (2010) Understanding the bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors: a primer.
Syracuse Law Rev 60:531
Warren E (1987) Bankruptcy policy. Univ Chic Law Rev 54:775
Warren E (1992) The untenable case for repeal of Chapter 11. Yale Law J 102:437
Warren E (1993) Bankruptcy policymaking in an imperfect world. Mich Law Rev 92:336
Warren E, Westbrook JL (2005) Contracting out of bankruptcy: an empirical intervention. Harv Law Rev
118:1197
Warren E, Westbrook JL (2009) The success of Chapter 11: a challenge to the critics. Mich Law Rev
107:603
Westbrook JL (1989) A functional analysis of executory contracts. Minn Law Rev 74:227
Westbrook JL (2000) A global solution to multinational default. Mich Law Rev 98:2276
Westbrook JL (2004) The control of wealth in bankruptcy. Tex Law Rev 82:795
White MJ (1994) Corporate bankruptcy as a filtering device: Chapter 11 reorganizations and out-of-court
debt restructurings. J Law Econ Organ 10:268
Woo SP (2011) Regulatory bankruptcy: how bank regulation causes fire sales. Georget Law J 99:1615
Corporate Bankruptcy Law 61
123
